The notion of Investment is one of the most controversial issues trailing the dispute settlement mechanism of International Center for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID). One notable issue surrounding the controversy is identifying an exact definition of investment for the purposes of ICSID Jurisdiction. While some tribunals tend to give effect to the agreement of the parties contained in their contracts or the underlying bilateral investment treaty as giving rise to the ICSID jurisdiction by consent, others tend to subject parties consent into a filtering mechanism based on a certain developed criteria. The aim of the paper is to add clarity to the corpus juris of investment treaty arbitration and provide guidance to the investment treaty tribunals regarding the determination of notion of investment. In doing so, the paper typifies the problem with the notable case of MHS v Malaysia. It then analyzes the two approaches from subjective and objective perspectives. The paper concludes with the proposition that ICSID notion of investment may not necessary lie with either of the two approaches.
INTRODUCTION:
In 1817, Diana, a British vessel carrying a large wooden cargo containing about 24,000 pieces of antique Chinese porcelain sank near straight of Malacca as it journeyed from China on its way to India. MHS, a United Kingdom based Company, incorporated under the laws of Malaysia as a foreign investor was contracted in 1991 by Malaysian Government to retrieve the treasure. The structure of the contract was such that MHS would only recover its expenditure and make profit if the recovery of the salvage was successful. Ie 'no finds no pay' basis. 1 Under a subsequent contract, 2 an auction would be arranged by MHS in Europe, while Malaysian Government will collect the sale proceeds and disburse to the claimant their entitlement of 70% of the proceeds should the amount reach less than $10m US dollars. If however, the aggregate of the sale is between S10m to $20M US Dollars, MHS's entitlement would reduce to 60% of the sale. Where the aggregate exceeded US$20 million MHS would be entitled to 50% of the sale proceeds. The salvage took four years, and salvaged items which were not withheld from sale, were auctioned for $2.98M (US). MHS were accordingly paid the sum of U$1.2 million which came to 40% of the amount realised from the sale. Article 52 (1) (b) of the ICSID Convention. After constituting an ad-hoc committee, the committee annulled the award on jurisdiction dated 17 th May 2007. 3 According to the committee, the tribunal had manifestly exceeded its powers by failing to exercise jurisdiction and to have recourse to the treaty definition of investment provided in UK/Malaysia BIT as an investment within the meaning of Article 25 (1) ICSID. In addition, the ad-hoc committee alluded to the failure of the tribunal to take into account the preparatory work (traveux) of ICSID as fatal, and the consequent elevation of investment criteria as jurisdictional requirements 4 all as amounting to excess of powers under the ICSID Convention.
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The MHS plight to have access to ICSID arbitration is undoubtedly one of the most historic, but obviously not the only 6 . MHS initially lost the right to be heard before the tribunal. MHS later, won before the Ad-hoc committee. However, with the dissenting opinion of one of the ad-hoc committee members, the future remains unpredictable particularly in a system that has no binding precedence such as ICSID. Thus, the jurisprudence regarding notion of investment is yet unsettled. The centrality of notion of investment in ICSID jurisprudence can 3 Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn., Bhd. v. The Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, (Decision on the Application for Annullment), April 16, 2009 4 According to the ad-hoc committee in para 80; "…(b) its analysis of these criteria elevated them to jurisdictional conditions, and exigently interpreted the alleged condition of a contribution to the economic development of the host State so as to exclude small contributions, and contributions of a cultural and historical nature;". These appear to be the point of departure between majority members of the ad-hoc committee ie (Stephen M. hardly be overstated. Undoubtedly, as it will be shown in the paper, MHS offers a moderate premise to analyse ICSID's jurisdictional dilemma relating to notion of investment.
Drawing on this lengthy, singular, albeit, condecental introduction with MHS v Malaysia, the paper engages with both objective and subjective approaches to the determination of notion of investment in ICSID jurisprudence.
The aim being to add clarity to the corpus juris of investment treaty arbitration and suggest guidance to the investment treaty tribunals regarding the determination of notion of investment.
The paper proceeds as follows. After the introduction, section two examines notion of investment under bilateral investment treaties. Section three analyses notion of investment under ICSID with a view to bring to fore, ICSID's notion of investment. Section four evaluates the issues arising out of the intersection between BIT's definition and ICSID's conception of investment . Section five concludes with suggestions on how the ICSID jurisidictional dilemma could be resolved within the framework of Vienna Convention on the law of treaties.
NOTION OF INVESTMENT UNDER BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES:
Since The circular definition, like asset based definition, apart from covering a wide range of forms of investment also contemplates future investments. The essence is to cover foreseeable investments that may come in the future. ." See; ibid 7-9. 18 Ibid., 19 Ibid., ii an equity security of an enterprise;
iii. a debt security of an enterprise… iv.a loan to an enterprise… vi. an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in income or profits of the enterprise; but investment does not mean, (X) claims to money that arise solely from (i) commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services by a national or enterprise in theterritory of a Party to an enterprise in the territory of the other Party, or
(ii) the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such as trade financing, … Conversely, the third category of treaty definition can be said to be self explanatory leaving little room for interpretation. This may not however be the case in the event of dispute. Since arbitral tribunals are bound to be confronted with various models of treaties crafted in different drafting styles. Even in the most apt and clarified method, the tribunals may be required to respond to a jurisdictional challenge tied to the notion of investment.
Therefore, treaty interpretation is a very crucial phenomenon in the settlement of investment disputes. In the next 2523-6547 -Copyright: © 2017 The Authors. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited section, the paper will examine the various approaches adopted by ICSID tribunals in responding to the jurisdictional challenges predicated upon notion of investment.
NOTION OF INVESTMENT UNDER ICSID:
Despite the centrality of the notion of investment under ICSID Convention, 20 The 21 The absence of definition of investment clearly posits an interpretative problem in the Convention. 22 As to why the convention does not define investment as crucial as it is, remains a mystery due to the contradictory reports between the documentation of the ICSID history and the content of the Executive Directors report. In one breadth the ICSID history shows various attempts to define investment during the negotiation of the Convention, while on the other hand the executive directors' report negates such attempt.
20 Schreuer, supra P. 121 21 In an effort to come up with an acceptable definition, ICSID Secretariat proposed the following to replace the wordings of Article 30 supra : "The term Investment means the acquisition of (i) property rights or contractual rights (including rights under a concession) for the establishment or in the conduct of an industrial, commercial, agricultural, financial or service enterprise; (ii) participations or shares in any such enterprise; or (iii) financial obligations of a public or private entity other than obligations arising out of short-term banking or credit facilities." See: History, Vol II P. 844 in Schreuer supra. 
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The result of the definitional tussle of notion of investment among the ICSID delegates gave birth to a range of arbitral wards that are far from being consistent looking at the ICSID jurisprudence as a whole. The diverse nature of such awards culminates into two broad schools or approaches 23 in the determination of whether disputes submitted before ICSID have passed through the jurisdictional test of Article 25 (1) of the Convention.
Subjective Approach:
Subjective theory is an approach adopted by ICSID tribunals that seeks to merge consent of the parties with the Indeed, the above article could not escape the criticism of the 'stakeholders' principally the state delegates, despite acknowledging the necessity of agreeing on a commonly accepted definition. Having failed to come up with a definition despite several attempts, the Convention left the parties with the option to determine the type of investments they will submit to ICSID's Jurisdiction.
The failure to define investment within the convention led to the emergence of subjective approach in conferring jurisdiction on ICSID tribunals. The subjectivist's construction of investment lies in the consent of parties to agree on the kinds of transactions/activities they can recognize as investment on one hand, and the freedom to make known in advance the kind of transactions/activities they do not wish to consider as investment on the other hand all of which are provided for under the Convention. The approach seem to negate the existence of any autonomous or independent notion of investment under ICSID, different from the consent of the parties. Indeed, the approach confirms the mystery and continued relevance of 'party autonomy' in ICSID arbitration, as revealed in
Pantechniki v Albania.
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Examining the subjective approach in the light of arbitral awards would reveal a list of 'precedence' that backs the subjectivist's perception of investment under ICSID. There is no definite pattern of categorizing the arbitral awards that relies on the subjectivists' theory in resolving jurisdictional challenges. This is due to the peculiarity of each case and the different analytical approach adopted by the arbitral tribunals. There is however, large number of ICSID awards that generally analyses the notion of investment under ICSID. Some of the notable cases that adopted the subjectivist's reasoning include: In Generation Ukraine Inc. V Ukraine the tribunal while considering US/Ukraine BIT relies totally on the BIT definition of 'investment' and absence of same in the ICSID 
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The tribunal relying on Greece/Egypt BIT held that leased property of in form of a ship is a protected investment under the BIT, and therefore becomes an investment under ICSID by virtue of the BIT definition. Of recent, Inmaris tribunal following Pantechniki tribunal, alluded to the relevance of party autonomy while applying subjective approach to the determination of notion of investment. 30 In otherwords, the principle of party seem to be the theoretical basis of applying subjective approach by the tribunals following the subjective approach.
Objective Approach:
Objective approach on the other hand denotes the existence of an independent ICSID notion of investment in accordance with the object and purpose of the entire ICSID Convention. According to Professor Schreuer: 
'The fact that the Convention has not defined the term investment does not mean, however, that anything consented by the parties might qualify as an investment under the Convention. The Convention itself in resorting to the concept of investment in connection with jurisdiction, establishes a framework to this effect: jurisdiction cannot be based on something different or entirely unrelated, In other words, it means that there is a limit to the freedom with the parties may define an investment if they wish to engage the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals. The parties to a dispute cannot by contract or treaty define as investment, for the purpose of ICSID jurisdiction, something which does not satisfy the objective requirements of
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The totality of the cited arbitral awards under this heading clearly portrays the trend ICSID notion of investment had taken over time. The objectivists approach regarding interpretation of article 25 (1) ICSID appears to have dominated the ICSID jurisprudence in terms of wider support from the ICSID historical documents, and line of arbitral awards. Thus, interpreting article 25 (1) ICSID in the light of its object and purpose epitomizes ICSID jurisdictional jurisprudence constante. However, opponents of objective approach faulted the approach on two strands. The first fallacy is the theme upon which the approach is propounded, while the second fallacy is the content of the approach. In other words, the inconsistency regarding the characteristics of investment alluded to by some of the tribunals.
THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN BIT'S DEFINITION OF INVESTMENT AND ICSID
CONCEPTION OF INVESTMENT:
Flowing from the two approaches analysed in section three, It can be observed that the matrix of issues surrounding article 25 (1) ICSID, can be understood along two polar ends of notion of investment. Namely, expansionists end and restrictionists end. While expansionists tend to welcome any attempt in expanding the ICSID notion of investment, restrictionists on the other hand tends to confine the notion to manifest transactions as investment under ICSID. Indeed much as the two approaches arguably might not reflect the correct jurisprudence of notion of investment, they however find support within the ICSID Jurisprudence. The postulation made herein is to look at the hallmark principles in the ICSID Convention, and evaluate such principles along the entire objective of the Convention. Recourse to the ICSID objective becomes necessary due to the fact that, literal or good faith rule of interpretation is far from resolving the definitional dilemma due to the absence of any definition to be literally interpreted.
a. Expansionism:
"It would seem consistent with the objective of the Convention that a contract, in order to be considered an investment within the meaning of the provision, should fulfill the following three conditions: a)the contracting party has made contributions in the host country; b)those contributions had a certain duration; and c)they involved some risks for the contributor. On the other hand, it is not necessary that the investment contribute more specifically to the host country's economic development, something that is difficult to ascertain and that is implicitly covered by the other three criteria." 
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Careful examination of the ICSID Convention would reveal that consent of the parties to submit disputes to the centre is at the heart of every claim brought pursuant to the provisions of the convention. In this regard, article 25
(1) sanctions the jurisdiction of the centre to legal investment disputes consented by the parties. The requirement of consent though crucial can be expressed through various means provided by the Convention. Here, there are three broad means of expressing consent to ICSID jurisdiction namely, -through direct agreement, host country legislation or through Investment treaties (both BITs and MITs).
In this context, where parties consented to treat certain types of transactions as investment, ICSID tribunals are under legal obligation to pronounce same as investment. This approach can be seen more glaringly where such consent is expressed through bilateral or multilateral investment treaty. In other words, this is in consonance with the subjective approach which accords more priority to the consent however expressed.
The second point supporting the expansionist approach from the realm of consent, though outside the Convention but contained in the additional facility rules is the power given to the parties to submit disputes that do not emanate directly out of an investment. Article 2 (b) of the ICSID additional facility rules provides in this regard:
'The Secretariat of the Centre is hereby authorized to administer,…conciliation and arbitration proceedings for the settlement of legal disputes which are not within the jurisdiction of the centre because they do not arise directly out of an investment,…'
The totality of this reasoning suggests the desirability of accommodating as many investment disputes as possible and strengthening the ICSID body as the largest dispute resolution mechanism governing investment disputes.
The restrictionist hallmarks on the other hand, can be seen in the various ICSID provisions. For the purpose of this work, two significant hallmarks will be evaluated. The first, is the power of the Secretary General of ICSID to screen disputes under Article 36 (6) 
Is BIT Definition a Negotiated Definition?
Generally, Bilateral Investment treaties are products of long term negotiation between two Countries. 37 The trend in negotiating bilateral Investment treaties is characterised with agreements, disagreements, modifications, alterations, and in some cases non agreement at all. 38 One essential feature that may be attributed to the treaty definition of investment is the conflicting interest dilemma between the two investment treaty states. 39 Balancing the competing interest is one of the most critical aspect in drafting Bilateral Investment treaties. 40 While this might look problematic the dilemma is only limited to the negotiation stage and should not be seen to proceed to the dispute resolution stage. In essence, once a treaty is signed, pre-treaty negotiating issues should not be seen to be resurrected by Arbitral tribunals.
Moreover, there are various negotiating/drafting mechanisms implored by 'the actors' to tackle such a problem.
One of such mechanisms is inserting a consultative mechanism clause in the bilateral Investment treaty. 41 The consultation clause has the effect of allowing the parties to periodically review the definitions contained in the 2523-6547 -Copyright: © 2017 The Authors. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited
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BIT with a view to remove unsatisfactory provisions, if any. Similarly, parties have option at the negotiation stage to exclude certain types of investment or limit the application of the BIT to a specifically defined types of investment. For instance while negotiating the definition of Investment in the MHS case, the Claimants made a proposal to broaden the meaning of investment under Article 1 of the UK/Malaysia BIT and the Respondent resisted the move and proposed a restriction to the definition to cover only investments in Malaysia. 42 To this end, it is submitted that in view of the freedom of the parties to choose either broad or narrow definition of investment, to adopt, amend, or halt BIT model agreements, BIT definitons of 'Investment' are negotiated definitions with full intent and purpose to acquire their intended meanings.
Conclusion
Generally, Claimants before ICSID tribunals must show that their underlying contract (if applicable) falls within the definition of investment as contained in both Article 25 (1) ICSID and Bilateral Investment Treaty. This proposition need to be understood as a golden thread that runs through the entire jurisdictional phase. As in MHS v Malaysia, the proposition was deduced from the submissions of the parties while relying on the ICSID decided cases. 43 The exercise of establishing the jurisdiction is quite significant in view of the tribunal's conclusion on the 'critical cases' as an elimination process through which the award is arrived at.
In addition, the approach adopted by MHS tribunal regarding the dichotomy between 'jurisdictional' and 'typical characteristic' approaches as parameters of assessing hall marks of Investment is undoubtedly significant.
However, the conclusion reached by the tribunal appear to confer supremacy on paragraph 50 of Joy Mining, and Salini's double-barrelled test. Indeed, the fate of investor/state definition of an 'investment' not as contained in a BIT but as defined by parties contracts may likely suffer same fate as BITs definition, something akin to defalcation of shared expectations of two contracting parties by a tribunal that ought to uphold and respect such expectations. 
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In this context, it is recommended that Article 31 (1) of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties can aid the ICSID tribunals not just to engage in literal interpretation (which some of the tribunals reluctanty discard on the ground that there was no definition to be literally interpreted) but to do so in accordance with the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention. Thus, taking into account the traveux and other relevant negotiation documentations of the treaty. 44 In this regard, not only subjective or objective approaches are relevant, rather, good faith ordinary meaning, in accordance with the treaty's object and purpose can harmonize both objective and subjective approaches and provide much needed guidance than either subjective or objective approaches in isolation.
44 See Articles 32 and 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties..
